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By all accounts, deuocratic theory is in a lanentable state. It has 
certainly not kept pace with, much less guided, changes which have 
occurred in the practice of politics over recent decades. It is as if 
the Western democracies, having defeated their anti-democratic foes 
in the Second World War (with the help of the Soviet Union) felt no 
further need to examine critically their changing political 
practices. Anything these polities did —  any public institutions 
they created, any private arrangements they tolerated —  were eo 
ipso democratic since they energed consensually (or at least without 
violence or discontinuity) from within polities which othervise 
respected basic civic rights and held regular contested elections.
In this context, much of what passed for democratic theory consisted 
of belated (and often apologetic) efforts at restatement, i.e. at




























































































institutions should be considered "denocratic" even if their 
inspiration was purely pragmatic or their intent purely utilitarian. 
And one must concede that this capacity for post factum incorporation 
has been one of the keys to the endurance of democratic theory. Just 
think of the institutions which were created for other, occasionally 
even diametrically opposed, motives that subsequently have become 
part-and-parcel of our contemporary conception of democracy: 
parliament, constitutions, mixed government, checks and balances', 
proportionality, factions or parties, interest organizations, 
consociational compromises, etc.
Of course, activitists and scholars have dared to criticize some of 
the more indiscriminate of these "realistic" accomodations on the 
grounds that they so stretch the concept of democracy that it loses 
all logical connection with its past meaning. Perhaps the pinnacle of 
this sort of stretching was reached when the American pluralists 
extolled the virtues of "apathy" and "slack resources" in explaining 
why the U.S. polity was both stable and democratic. Unfortunately, 
these critical efforts at retrieval often have a reactionary cast to 
then. They imply (or explicitly urge) that the ensuing (and often 
well-entrenched ) practices be somehow erradicated and the polity be 
returned to sane more desirable (and often unprecedented) state of 
greater conformity to democratic principles. Since it is usually left 
unclear what likely configuration of power would produce such a purge 
or what possible transfornation of citizen attitudes would have to 




























































































academic. They nay stimulate heated discussion among philosophers and 
ideologues, but few lead to actual experiments in more democratic 
governance.
This essay is neither an effort at restatement nor at retrieval. It 
aims at a reconstruction of democratic theory. It will attanpt to 
exaudne critically the duplications and consequences of the emergence 
of neo-corporatist arrangements for the practice of deuocracy in 
advanced industrial/capitalist societies without "( indulging) in the 
fantasy of an unconstrained ideal order" (1 ). In other words, it 
accepts the fact that important structural changes have occurred in 
the way class, sectoral and professional interests are organized and 
in the way these organizations relate to each other and to the state 
in polities which have otherwise retained open, competitive electoral 
processes and civic liberties. However, it neither accepts these 
changes as denocratic because they seem to have been spontaneously 
created and voluntarily agreed upon, nor does it engage in the 
wishful fantasy that they represent merely temporary aberrations 
dooued to collapse in short order before the opposition of democratic 
forces. Neo-corporatist arrangements are well-entrenched —  much more 
so in some polities than others —  and, at least at the level of 
popular consciousness, they have yet to be rejected as manifestly un- 
democratic. The task of constructive democratic theory in this 
context is twofold: (a) to examine critically the impact of neo- 
corporatist arrangements with an eye to modifying or minimizing them 




























































































denocracy; (b) to identify the agents or processes which ridght 
possibly pronote such a more desirable outcome.
DEMOCRACY
Our obvious first task is to establish as clearly as possible what 
our standard of denocratic performance is. Only then can we 
convincingly argue that a given arrangement is or is not compatible 
with it. Denocracy is a principle, embodied in a set of rules, 
expressed through a complex of institutions, which is aimed at 
establishing or sustaining a certain quality of relationship between 
those who rule and those who are ruled. Its guiding principle is that
of citizenship, i.e. the right to be treated by fellow human beings 
as equal and the obligation to respect the legitinacy of choices nade 
by collective deliberation among equals. The decision rules which 
embody this principle have varied a great deal historically —  
varying from unanindty, to qualified majority, to concurrent 
minorities, to the presently predominant ( but by no means universal) 
one of simple majority (2) —  as have the eligibility rules for 
participation which define who is a citizen and how he/she can act 
politically. Secret balloting, universal suffrage, civic freedoms, 
regular elections and party competition are elements common to
virtually all efforts at conceptualizing "modern procedural 
denocracy" (3), while others such as proportional representation, 
public financing of parties and unrestricted access to information 
are not (yet) such integral components of the procedural minimum. 




























































































express the citizenship principle and to embody the procedural rules 
have varied even more over time and across units. Open assemblies, 
hereditary or appointed chambers, popularly elected presidencies, 
party caucuses, electoral primaries, worker's councils, advisory 
committees, federal states, referenda, ombudsmen, —  just to name a 
few —  have all been considered legitimate, if different, expressions 
of denocratic institutions at one time or another.
The historically variant procedures and institutions for translating 
the principle of denocratic citizenship into practice are presumably 
not ends in themselves (or else, why would they have been modified so 
much and so often? ). Rather, they should be regarded as the means for 
establishing a particular sort of relationship between rulers and 
ruled. The ideal, of course, has always been to abolish this 
distinction so that citizens could practice self-government, i.e. not 
only be free and equal in their choices of what course or collective 
action to take, but free and equal in the carrying out of that 
course. Once increased size, international threat, decisional 
complexity, etc. make that ideal unattainable —  wherever citizens 
accept the need for permanent governance by some specialized set of 
rulers —  then the crucial criteria for evaluating democratic 
performance becomes the quality of that ruling relationship. What 
those criteria should be and in the event of conflicting capabilities 
which should have priority, have been the subject of much discussion 
and little agreement. First, it may be useful to distinguish whether 




























































































citizens or authorities. In other words, is democracy a quality 
inherent in the behavior of the individuals that compose it?, or of 
the collectivity that governs then? A second evaluative dimension 
focuses on the process of policy-making and distinguishes between the 
input and the output aspects of governing. This asks whether a given 
government is "of the people", or whether it is "for the people" —  
whether it affords opportunities for citizens to become equally 
involved, or whether it does things which equally benefit then. 
Figure I is an effort to depict these contrasting (but not 





























































































THE QUALITIES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
I. The Aspect of Governance 
"Of the People" "For the People"
II. The Unit of Reference: 
Individual Citizens
Public Authorities
Participation is the virtue stressed by those who regard democracy 
primarily from the point of view of individual citizens playing an 
active and equal role in the making of collective decisions. Judged 
from the perspective of public authorities, government of the people 
should be accessible by treating the preferences and danands of all 
citizens —  organized or unorganized, concordant or discordant, 







































































































second, vertical, axis of what governments do rather than who gets 
involved, the extent to which individual citizens can hold their 
rulers accountable through some process of regular consultation and 
non-arbitrary deliberation becomes the most democratic standard one 
can apply. Finally, responsiveness would seem to be the best term for 
designating the collective property of a democratic ruling class 
which guarantees that citizen needs will be met and, hence, that the 
exercise of public pcwer will be legitimated.
Finally and most controversially, competitiveness seems to lay at the 
core of the entire modem daaocratic process, affecting both 
individuals and authorities as well as the input and output of 
governance. Classical democratic theory certainly didn't stress this 
quality. Rather the contrary, the presumption was that free 
deliberation among equals would produce a singular, ethically 
superior, consensus ("the public good"). Those who persisted in 
dissenting from it were expected to leave the community or renounce 
their citizenship. One quiet revolution in the modern conception of 
social order —  later translated, so-to-speak, into denocratic theory 
—  was the notion that communities could persist, even thrive despite 
stable divergences of belief, interest, lifestyle, etc. in their 
midst. First, with the tolerance of religious dissent and, later and, 
however precariously, with respect to status, class, linguistic, 
ethnic, generational, gender and other cleavages, democracy became 
virtually identified with the acceptance of social pluralism and, 




























































































non-violent competition for office and influence. Presumibly, 
coinpetitiveness stiiiiulates citizens to participate more actively, 
encourages authorities to be accessible to a greater multiplicity of 
demands, enforces more accountability on the part of policy- 
implementors and ensures that collective choices will be responsive 
to the full range of diversity present in a given society. Without 
it, the whole natrix of democratic qualities risks degenerating into 
formalistic ritual, choreographed consent, symbolic distortion and/or 
generalized apathy.
"Of course!", the reader nay protest, "a truly democratic polity 
should be all these things: participatory, accessible, accountable, 
responsive and competitive. Why bother even to distinguish among 
than?" One answer is that some of these qualities nay be antithetic 
under particular conditions. Another is that scarcity of resources 
nay force citizens and/or rulers to choose one over the other. But 
for the purposes of this essay, what is important is that a given new 
institution or arrangement nay contribute to satisfying one of these 
virtuous qualities —  and, therefore, acquire a form of democratic 
legitimation —  while undermining the others. This, as we shall see 
below, nay well be the case of neo-corporatism.
DEMOCRATIZATION
Denocratization in its most generic sense has involved the 
progressive extension of the citizenship principle to encompass a 




























































































which collective choice among equals (or their representatives) can 
make binding decisions upon all. Tocqueville was probably correct in 
identifying this as one of the strongest underlying trends in modern 
times. There have been, of course, some horrendous exceptions to this 
generalization, even within the heartland of denocratic practice. It 
is, however, significant that even contemporary dictatorships usually 
v define thaaselves as "regimes d 1 exception11 and justify their 
existence on the grounds (however dubious) that they are dedicated to 
returning the polity eventually to some higher or more purified form 
of democracy. Moreover, recent developments in Southern Europe and 
Latin Meric a give us reason for renewed faith in the existence of 
such a telos, if only because tyrannical regimes seem incapable of 
resolving self-generated contradictions (4).
Denocracy has survived because its defenders have managed to assert 
its principle/procedures/institutions/qualities against the competing 
claims of other formulae for making collective choices and ensuring 
public order. Democratization has progressed because its promoters 
have succeeded in extending those properties into economic and social 
domains previously governed by other allocation rules and authority 
principles. But even where it has been successfully defended or 
extended, democracy has always been compelled to make more-or-less 
enduring institutional compromises with a variety of antithetic 
practices. Social hierarchies based on tradition, market allocations 
of value, and specialized commands over knowledge are all 




























































































actors to unequal positions, they define certain domains as 
"inappropriate" for public scrutiny and accountability, and they 
resign citizens to the acceptance of choices made by more 
prestigeous, more knowledgeable, more powerful or better endowed 
others: notables, cwners or experts. Nowhere among existing
democracies has the principle of self-government among equals 
prevailed exclusively, and this is conveniently (if of ten 
misleadingly) symbolized by the insertion of a qualifying adjective 
before the term: e.g., representative-, liberal-, bourgeois-, social- 
, proletarian-, people's-, etc.
One reason for such standing compromises stems simply from the fact 
that contanporary denocracies operate through a multiplicity of 
specific, historically-conditioned, political units —  namely, 
secular, territorial states or, worse, large nation-states. Their 
pre-danocratic heritage, their inveterate conflictualness, their 
sheer size and extension, their diffuse loyalties —  all protect and 
encourage competing principles and make the democratic one more 
difficult to realize. Inherited status groups are respected for their ( 
past contributions; specialized elites are allowed to act with 
impunity on grounds of national defense or grandeur; representative 
agents are weakly connected to large and heterogeneous - 
constituencies; nationalistic sentiments are manipulated in order to 
subordinate cultural diversities. If this were not enough, democracy 
itself has greatly increased the individual and group needs subject 




























































































resulted in an enormous expansion and centralization of the permanent 
apparatus for processing these claims, namely the state bureaucracy. 
The whole production of public goods becomes increasingly indirect 
and technically incomprehensible to the average citizen.
Marxists rightly have stressed for sane time the limits placed on the 
democratic principle and its varying procedures / institutions / 
qualities by the existence of private property rights which protect 
their owners, constitutionally or otherwise, from popular scrutiny or 
control. The subsequent development of large business corporations 
with unprecedented resources and capabilities for affecting whole 
populations, and the internationalization of exchange and production 
relations which can effectively circumvent the control of even the 
most democratic of danestic polities have certainly added further 
elements of credibility to this critique. Nevertheless, the recent 
revival of interest in "state theory" has contributed surprisingly 
little to democratic theory —  this, despite Marx's early and 
explicit recognition of a contradiction between the equality of 
citizenship and the inequality of ownership. From an instrumental or 
a functionalist perspective, the Marxists' answer to the question of 
neo-corporatism's compatibility with democracy would seem to be so 
obvious as to be axiaiatic. Given what is "known" about the 
distribution of "real" power in capitalist societies and bourgeois 
dauocracies, such institutional innovations can only be the product 
either of conscious intent by the ruling class to maintain its 




























































































minority of owners over the majority of citizens. Indeed, one 
prominent approach to neo-corporatism explicitly defines the 
phenomenon in terms of its function of subordinating the working- 
class to the imperatives of capital (5).
Recent discussions by Marxists in the conditions for establishing 
"class compromise" ( 6 ) and the role of "democratic antagonisms" ( 7 ) 
seem to be opening up new grounds within this tradition for a less 
aprioristic and, perhaps, less unfavorable treatment of neo­
corporatism. Social denocrats, of course, have been guilty, not only 
of harboring, but of promoting such thoughts for some time (8), 
although they have usually been prudent enough to keep the specific 
concept of corporatism disquised by euphemisms. What remains is for 
than to came more explicitly to terms with the limitations on 
democratic practice sketched above. These are imposed by the state 
form of political organization (especially in its increasingly 
centralized configuration) and by the technocratic basis of 
administrative power (especially in the realm of social welfare). 
With these elements in hand, we might then have an adequate 





























































































Schmitter - 1 5
From this brief Problanestellung, we can draw the following 
conclusions:
(a ) The citizenship principle provides the constant and common 
elaaent to all theoretical efforts to define daaocracy but cannot be 
used alone to evaluate democratic performance. Nevertheless, if neo­
corporatism can be clearly shewn to diminish equal treatment or to 
reduce citizen acceptance of choices made by equal collective 
deliberation, then it must be regarded prima facie as undanocratic.
( b ) Because this principle has been and can be expressed through a 
variety of decision rules and political institutions, to accept or 
reject neo-corporatist arranganents on the grounds of their 
compatibility with any particular configuration of thaa —  even such 
established ones as majority rule or parliamentary sovereignty —  
would be ahistorical. That would be to deny one of deaocracy's 
greatest strengths, namely, its capacity for dynamic adaptation to 
changing circumstances. Nevertheless, neo-corporatism should be, at 
the very least, compatible with the prevailing "procedural minimum" - 
- civic freedom, universal suffrage, etc —  since these are 
prerequisites for continued democratic experimentation with specific 
rules and institutions.
(c) The qualitative democratic relationships of participation, 
acessibility, responsiveness, accountability and competitiveness seem 
to provide us with the best criteria for evaluating neo-corporatist 




























































































inherent in established rules and institutions and because they offer 
a more comprehensive perspective — individuals and authorities, input 
and output functions —  from which to judge the whole or net impact 
of such practices.
(d ) Existing democracies involve compromises with other ways of 
allocating values and exercising authority and are all, therefore, 
"secondbest" approximations. A realistic and reconstructive critique 
of neo-corporatism should not be based on its presumed ability to 
eli/idnate completely these constraints —  the state form of political 
organization, the competitive form of international relations, the 
adiidnistrative form of policy implementation, the commodity form of 
economic production —  but on its observed capacity "to strike a 
better deal" when making comprondses with than. From a dynamic point 
of view, the crucial question is whether neo-corporatism can better 
defend in the present and assert in the future the democratic 
principle of citizenship against competing ones than can other 
feasible configurations of decision rules or representative 
institutions.
NEO-CORPORATISM
The concept of corporatism, usually accompanied by some prefix such 
as "societal-", "liberal-", "bargained-" or, more recently, "neo-", 





























































































in prominence, to the point that it has been described by one author 
as "a growth industry" (10). Confused in political discourse with 
Fascism and authoritarian rule —  not to mention with the French- 
Italian polemic usage which identifies it with the pursuit of narrow 
and immediate sectoral interests —  and confounded in academic 
discussion by competing definitions and theoretical approaches, it 
has became a controversial subject, an "essentially contested" 
concept. Neo-corporatism (the neo is intended both to separate it 
fram its historical predecessors —  whether nedieval or interwar —  
and to indicate its relative novelty) has been found everywhere —  
and nowhere. It has been credited with producing all sorts of goods - 
- and charged with promoting all natter of evils. It has been 
described as an inexorable political trend —  and called a passing 
academic fancy. Most of all, it has been difficult to define neo­
corporatism clearly and consensually. One of its strengths has been 
its ability to speak to the concerns of scholars from different 
disciplines and orientations — each of whom, however, has tended to 
give his or her own twist to the concept. It has becane virtually 
impossible to tell whether all of the contributors to this growth 
industry are talking about related, much less identical, phenomena.
For purposes of this essay, neo-corporatism refers to a recently 
emergent political arrangenent —  not to a new way of running the 
econoriy (11 ) or ordering the entire society (12). It is concerned 
primarily with the activities of permanently organized and 




























































































enterprises, corporations, etc. ), not units of consumption 
(individuals, families, cooperatives, etc.), not units of status or 
affect (corps, colleagues, cliques, etc.) and not units of public 
authority (state agencies, ministries, parliaments, local 
governments, etc.). These associations seek to advance or defend 
interests by influencing and contesting collective choices. And they 
do this by intermediating between members and various interlocutors 
(mostly the State) without presenting candidates for electoral 
approval or accepting direct responsability for the fornation of 
governments (i.e. they are not parties, caucuses, coalitions, etc.). 
Any or all of the other above mentioned units of political action nay 
have a significant effect on the energence or viability of neo­
corporatism by supporting, opposing, or circumventing it, but they 
are not an integral part of its defining properties. Indeed, it is 
arguable that neo-corporatist practices have proven compatible with a 
rather wide range of surrounding units.
Hcwever, neo-corporatist arrangements are not the only way in which 
intermediation between interest associations and authoritative 
interlocutors can be institutionalized. Indeed, if one leaves aside 
medieval precedents and the short period of state-enforced 
corporatization under interwar dictatorships, they are relatively 
recent and rare. For a considerable period, the predominant way of 
conceptualizing interest intermediation was "pluralism" and a very
J------------ - -
substantial and impressive literature on that topic was devoted to 
deuonstrating that its arrangements were not just compatible with, 




























































































which hangs over neo-corporatism is due not just to the objections of 
those "Utopians" who reject organized intermediation and 
incorporation of partial interests into policy-making on the grounds 
that it is destructive of the direct citizen role in public affair 
and of government by popular asseuibly, but to the suspicions of 
"realists" that these new arrangements represent a serious distortion 
and perversion of "proven" pluralist processes.
So, it would seem particularly appropriate in this context to define 
(neo-) corporatism by contrasting it with (neo-) pluralism. Such an 
approach has been criticized by some as epiphenoirtenal, as too 
"institutional" and "political-sciency", but this is to underestimate 
both the depth and breadth of the latter. For pluralism has never 
been "just" a theory of representation and political institutions. It 
also addresses important issues of the constitution of civil society, 
the nature of its component values and interests and the self­
organization of groups within it, as well as of the formation of 
public policy and its impact on citizen satisfaction and 
legitiiaation. It is no more "normative" in its bias than most, so- 
called, political economy models and since, in this case, its bias is 
unabashedly toward a particular type of "representative democracy", 
it provides us with a ready-made standard of evaluation.
Any mode of organized interest intermediation —  pluralist, 
corporatist or, for that matter, syndicalist, monist, or whatever —  




























































































an arrangement for communicating and transforming member preferences 
into claims on others; (2) an arrangement for monitoring and 
influencing subsequent behaviour involved in realizing those claims. 
In the terminology of systems theory, it involves both input and 
output functions . These two aspects can be labelled: representation 
and control. Associations which operate in this political space are 
in the Janus-like position of intermediating between and focusing 
simultaneously upon two distinctive publics or clienteles. On the one 
hand, they must structure the/aselves internally and engage in such 
relevant activities that they offer sufficient incentives to their 
nembers so that they can extract adequate resources in the form of 
dues, fees, taxes, donations, voluntary labor, compliance, etc. to 
ensure at least their survival, if not their organizational growth. 
On the other hand, they must offer sufficient incentives to their 
interlocutors (i.e. state agencies,other associations, political 
parties) to be able to obtain other resources: recognition, 
toleration, access, protection, concessions, subsidization, etc., 
that are also needed for then survive and certainly to prosper. In 
other words, as specialized intermediaries, interest associations 
face a complex set of choices stewing from the often contradictory 
logics of appealing to members and exercising influence over 
interlocutors. Although pluralist theorizing about this domain has 
tended to underplay the control aspect and to make rather benevolent 
assumptions about the motives and activities of interlocutors (to the 
point of almost eliminating the distinctive coercive powers and 



























































































reconstruct the more-or-less implicit asstuaptions about these
elements of the political process and to contrast pluralist and 






























































































PROPERTIES DISTINGUISHING PURE PLURALIST 
AND PURE CORPORATIST MODES OF INTERMEDIATION
Associations Role I. REPRESENTATION (INPUT )
Associational Pluralist --------- Corporatist
Resources
I. IN RELATION 
TO MEMBERS
II. IN RELATION 
TO
INTERLOCUTORS
Multiple units ---  Monopolistic units
Overlapping claims—  Differentiated domains
Autonomous -------  Hierarchical
interaction coordination
Voluntary adherence- Involuntary contribution
Mutual tolerance —  Explicit recognition




Shifting alliances—  Stable compromises
( log-rolling ) ( package-dealing )
II. CONTROL (OUTPUT)
IN RELATION Persuasive -------- Interest
conviction indoc trinat ion
TO MEMBERS




Selective goods --- Monopolistic goods








Mobilization of -- Withdrawal from
pressure ( protest concentration






















































































































































































Figure II outlines summarily the property space surrounding the role 
and resources of interest associations and contrasts the elements of 
a pure corporatist and a pure pluralist mode of structuring such 
relationships. The distinctions drawn are, needless to say, logical 
not empirical. They are subject to gradations and approximations, and 
no single existing polity exactly replicates the entire Gestalt 
formed by its dichotomous properties. More importantly, as a good 
deal of research has demonstrated, within any single polity the 
configuration of organized interests nay vary considerably by policy 
arena. Even the sane interest organization —  business association, 
trade union or professional association —  nay be operating 
simultaneously in a more pluralist or corporatist fashion as it 
interacts with different agencies or levels of government. Much of 
the confusion in the literature stems from the propensity of scholars 
either to focus exclusively on representation rather than control or 
on relations with members rather than with interlocutors, or to 
"privilege" a particular issue arena and level of governance —  one 
of the favorites has been national incomes policies —  and to 
generalize on the basis of the presence/absence, success/failure of 
such specific arrangeiients.
Figure II should make it clear —  if nothing else —  that neo­
corporatism is a very complex bundle of changes in the relationship 
of associations to member interests and public policy-making. What is 
more, at a given moment in time and for a given issue in contention, 
the elenents within the matrix may be far from consistent (as, 




























































































configurations). For example, in a particular country or policy 
sector, associations may have a monopoly on representation, enter 
into hierarchical coordinative arrangements with each other and 
generate most of their resources involuntarily, but not have much 
control over the formation of member preferences, the formal 
authority to affect member behavior or the effective sanctions to 
apply if their rules are transgressed. Even where these properties 
exist with respect to members, interlocutors (especially state 
authorities) nay refuse to grant them corresponding corporatist 
"rights". They nay not officially recognize existing monopolies, 
establish formal systems of guaranteed representation or depend on 
associational approval for the taking of policy measures. And even 
where they do this, when it comes to the actual allocation of goods 
or administration of regulations, they nay not use associations to 
govern the compliance of affected interests, nake associations co- 
responsible for subsequent decisions or devolve upon them authority 
to carry out directly the necessary tasks.
Seen this way, neo-corporatism is a very complex "bundle" of changes 
in the relation of organized interests to policy-making. Moreover, 
precisely because it has evolved in such a piecerral and uneven 
nanner, over a considerable period of time in response to very 
different circumstances in class relations, sectoral conflicts, 
status rivalties, international pressures, etc., and also perhaps 
because it has not been accompanied by a powerful and explicit 




























































































manifestations of corporatism are exceptionally diverse, difficult to 
capture, and subject to conflicting interpretation.
Let us set aside the considerable empirical problen posed by using 
such a logically consistent and abstract, ideal-typic, model to 
describe and analyze existing configurations. Contemporary research 
in Western Europe has been quite inventive in discovering and 
labelling mixed configurations with differing sets of participants at 
varying levels of policy-making (13). What is especially relevant 
here is the speculative question of emergent properties. Are the 
polities of advanced industrial/capitalist societies moving 
inexorably in the sane general direction away from pluralism toward 
corporatism —  inhibited only momentarily and circumstantially by 
differences in historical points of departure, prevailing class 
conjunctures, international vulnerability, state capacities, 
political culture, etc?. Or are they likely to reiiain frozen into 
different configurations varying not only according to entrenched 
subjective national experiences but also with persistent objective 
differences in the stincture of interest conflicts which define their 
particular classes, sectors, professions, strata, entitlement 
categories, or "causes"? For a tentative answer to this question, we 
must look now diachronically, not synchronically, into the historical 
processes which have promoted these changes in associability and 





























































































Given the unevenness with which neo-corporatist arrangements are 
spread across countries and policy sectors and the variety in their 
structures, it may seem surprising that there are any general 
theories about how they may have cone about, but there are. Moreover, 
there exist two strongly contrasting "hunches" which lead to 
virtually diametrically opposite evaluations with respect to 
democracy.
The one, particularly prominent in Scandinavia, tends to interpret 
neo-corporatism as part of a long-term and gradual historical process 
involving the rationalization of social relations. The energence of 
monopolistic representation through the elimination of prior overlaps 
in functional domains or ideological programs, the subordination of 
previously autonomous organizations to the hierarchical control of 
sectoral or class "peak associations", the granting and formalizing 
of direct access to state agencies and the acquisition of negotiative 
status, the acceptance of co-responsibility for courses of action 
subsequently decided upon, and the use of associations as agents for 
policy-implementation —  all these hallmarks of neo-corporatism are 
regarded as an extension to the realm of interest intermediation of 
organizational developments which first became prevalent elsewhere. 
Moreover, since much of this simplification, specialization, 
"explicitization" , standardization, bureaucratization, etc. of 
relationships is the result of policies carried out at the express 
will of the people, or, better, through its majoritarian partisan 
representative:social danocracy, there can be little or no doubt 




























































































perspective, the historical development of bureaucracy and that of 
democracy go hand-in-hand. Their allocative and procedural principles 
may be different, even antagonistic, but they are intrinsically 
complementary. "Advances" in one of these choice/control mechanisms 
will call forth countervailing changes in the other. Neo-corporatism 
(or "societal bargaining" as Walter Korpi prefers to term it) is 
nothing but the inevitable, if not always intentional, sideproduct of 
such a dynamic process. As such, it is not merely compatible with 
democracy, but part of an advanced, better organized form of 
democracy in which capacities for collective action are more equally 
distributed and relations to authority rendered more predicable and 
public.
The obverse "hunch" —  also presented, of course, as a confirued 
theoretical generalization —  is that neo-corporatism is a product of 
"the laws of capitalist developilent", or more accurately, of a crisis 
in the historical course of that developnent. What is the nature of 
the specific crisis that induces such a change in organized class 
relations is a natter of some controversy among neo-Marxists, e.g. a 
"legitimation deficit", a productivity-profit squeeze, a change in 
the requisites of competitive survival in the World System, a shift 
in class forces, a decline in bourgeois parliamentarism. But what is 
clear from this perspective is that neo-corporatism is a deliberate 
strategy on behalf of a propertied minority enjoying unequal benefits 
—  not an unintended sideproduct of a majoritarian demand for more 
equal treatment. The benefitted class, i.e. capitalists, may not 




























































































stubbornly cling to their out-moded ideology of individualistic 
competition and voluntaristic cooperation, but "their state" 
functions predicably and reliably to ensure their social reproduction 
and, therefore, intervenes to protect their long-term, objective 
interests by promoting the formation of neo-corporatist arrangements. 
Since these will not operate without some degree of collaboration 
from "social partners", trade union leaders, consumer 
representatives, and so forth must be hegemonically convinced by 
internalizing the norms of reformist ideology and/or personally 
coopted by enjoying organizational payoffs to participate in them. 
Neo-corporatism is, therefore, intrinsically undaaocratic, a major 
barrier to the attainment of a more participatory, just and 
responsive polity. Fortunately, however, according to these theorists 
it can only be a temporary expedient. Its dependence on cyclically- 
generated surpluses, its asymmetric distribution of benefits and its 
ultimate inability to inaster the contradictions of capitalist 
production will destroy it in the longer run. Whether it will be 
replaced fcy a advancement to a higher form of democratic socialism or 
recession to a lower form of authoritarian capitalism depends on "the 
balance of class forces" at the moment this intrinsic crisis 
manifests itself —  and it is the function of radical democratic 
theory to promote the more desirable outcome.
Between these sharply divergent poles of analysis and evaluation lies 
a somewhat confused and eclectic bunch of interpretations of why neo­
corporatism has emerged, who is likely to benefit from its 




























































































the broad, parametric effect of the "organizational revolution" (14) 
which swept contagiously across countries and social groups since 
roughly the 1890s, and the shift in internal class and external 
competitive relations which has occurred in advanced capitalist 
societies especially during the protracted, post-World War II 
expansion, these eclectic approaches tend to stress both the 
differential spread of the organizational phenomenon and its 
relevance to internal conflicts not strictly deterndned by the 
struggle between capital and labor. Neo-corporatism becomes less the 
predictable or inevitable product of some general trend than an 
opportunistic, pragmatic and often unintended response to disparate 
circumstances. It has been promoted (and occasionally inhibited) by 
episodic events such as wartime exigencies, peacetime reconstruction, 
foreign occupation and regime discontinuities; it has been affected 
by constant national differences in size, strategic location, 
resource bases, patterns of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
diversity, etc.; and perhaps most importantly, its emergence has 
depended on specifically political variables such as the electoral 
strength of Social Democracy, the centralization of administrative 
structures, the distinctiveness of recruitment and training of civil 
servants, the rootedness of territorial-parliamentary systems of 
representation, the ideological fragmentation of class forces, and 
the shifting substantive content of public policy. These are 
conditions which tend to vary much more across and within countries 
than do their respective levels of organizational rationalization or 
capitalist development. However, by introducing so much contingency 




























































































approaches to neo-corporatism make much more difficult the evaluation 
of its positive or negative consequences for democracy. Their answer 
(and iidne ) is likely to be a limp and inconclusive "it depends".
ASSOCIABILITY AND THE PURSUIT OF INTERESTS
The genus of which neo-corporatism is such a relatively recent 
species is associability —  the propensity for groups of persons 
within a larger polity to join together in some more-or-less 
formalized way to pursue through collective action interests they 
believe they have in common. Political authorities are not always 
tolerant of such efforts. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say 
that, historically, they have most often been outright hostile to 
self-constituted, self-regarding and self-actuating "factions" 
defining them as subversive of public order and divisive of state 
sovereignty. This "worms-in-the-entrails-of-the-body-politic" view 
has recently resurfaced in the conservative literature on "overload" 
which claims that the alleged ungovernability of contemporary 
danocracies is due to excessive activity by groups acting in selfish 
disregard for higher public purpose and usurping tasks which should 
be left to enlightened elites (1 5).
Nor have democratic theorists and political progressives always been 
supportive of associability. The sheer presence of such 
intermediaries could be seen as a factor distorting the relation 
between individual citizens and sovereign authorities —  interjecting 
partial wills into the process of general will formation or 




























































































transformation. This thane of direct, unmediated danocracy was 
articulated most emphatically by Rousseau and reached its apotheosis 
during the French Revolution in the Loi le Chapelier of 1791 banning 
"all types of associations among citizens of the sane status or 
profession under any pretext or any form that exists". It returned 
again, over a century later, this tine as farce, in the pretense 
within "popular denocratic" regimes that the ruling revolutionary- 
party represents all legitimate interests and that whatever 
associations are tolerated must be subordinate to its will.
Elsewhere the evolving practice of democracy began to recognize 
freedom of association as a basic civic liberty —  part of the 
procedural minimum we discussed above. Beginning with the 
constitutional breakthroughs of the United States (1792), Belgium 
(1830), Switzerland and Denmark (1848-9), it became increasingly 
difficult to deny citizens the right to found or join associations on 
account of their class, race, condition of dependence, sex or age. 
Authorities did (and still do) use other legal pretexts to prevent 
certain groups from assembling and, most of all from acting 
collectively, e.g. "subversive intent", "restraint of trade", "breach 
of the peace", "violation of property". They also can employ other, 
less legal, impediments such as police harassment, denial of access 
to public facilities, tax penalties and outright violence, but within 
most social groups in Western Europe and North America citizens have 
been able for sone tine to create permanent organizations for the 
defense of their interests; recruit (and even reject) members as they 




























































































and accuriiulate property; sue (and be sued by others); engage in the 
activities of their own choosing; petition authorities when they 
please on the topics they prefer —  subject only to certain modest 
requirements of formal registration and respect for the criminal law 
and tax code. More recently and less widely, associations have 
acquired the legal right to exclusive recognition as bona fide 
negotiators for their members, to be consulted before decisions 
within their interest domain can be made, to receive information and 
subsidies from state officials, and to participate directly in the 
implementation of public policy.
Most of these rights and attendant obligations were acquired by 
associations through struggle, compromise and pragmatic sanction, 
punctuated only occasionally by constitutional revision or landmark 
court decisions. Democratic theory only belatedly (and in some case, 
reluctantly - cf. Madison's famous 10th Federalist paper) caught up 
with these changes, although Alexis de Tocqueville had the genius to 
recognize the significance of associability at a relatively early 
stage of its development in what was then its most advanced site: the 
United States. His famous hypothesis has stood the test of time 
astonishingly well: "For men to become or remain civilized, the art 
of association must develop and perfect itself anong them in the same 
measure as the equality of conditions among them grows" (16). Frau 
this perspective, one can deduce that the more freedom of action 
associations can enjoy, the more members they can recruit, the more 
activities they can engage in, the greater the coverage they can 




























































































likely to be, to become or to retain. Leaving aside that "démocratie" , 
is not exactly what Tocqueville meant by "civilisation", this 
postulated linkage between associability and democracy seems to be 
one of the closest, most virtuous and best established we have - 
rivaled only fcy that between elections and democracy. Hew could one 
possibly attack such an assumption?
Robert Michels probably fired the first salvo when he pointed to the 
resources which incumbent leaders within associations could 
manipulate in order to maintain oligarchic control (17). The 
subsequent increase in size with the auergence of large-scale 
national organizations has entailed an inevitable loss of personal 
contact among maabers and a more indirect system of internal 
governance. As one distinguished French student of associability put 
it: "associations are subject to the same processes of growth and
giantism as private enterprises" (18). All those imputed benevolent 
qualities of Tocqueville's which hinged on social intimacy and 
democratic experience became more dubious. Empirical inquiry 
subsequently discovered that only exceptional associations —  even 
in relatively pluralist contexts —  were able to sustain the sort of 
active participation, open competition and close accountability which 
made them into "schools of civic virtue" (19). The demonstrated 
prevalence of entrenched oligarchy also raised the uncomfortable 
possibility that association leaders might be collecting "political 
rents" for themselves in the form either of self-serving 
appropriation of group benefits or the public proutotion of interests 




























































































The next serious general assaults on the associability-dernocracy 
citadel came from Mancur Olson in his Logic of Collective Action 
(20). Working within a voluntaristic and individualistic frame of 
reference, he argued that limitations on the ability to extract 
contributions for the provision of public goods would encourge
A
associationai entrepreneurs to offer increasing quantities of 
selective goods whose consumption could be restricted to members. In 
effect, interest groups would have to become more like business firms 
if they wished to recruit meinbers and develop their resources 
further. This would distort their internal processes away from the 
democratic concern with nobilization and representation, thereby, 
diminishing the role of militant action, ideological conviction and 
voluntary participation in favor of passive confonidty, material 
consumption and professional management. It would also tend to free 
association officials to pursue public goals not necessarily shared 
by members, thereby, increasing further the rate at which "political 
rents" were likely to be levied.
Olson's perspective also challenged the validity of one of the 
most central (and democratic) assertions of pluralist theory —  
narely, that given din equal freedom to associate and an equivalent 
intensity of interest, a spontaneous and dynamic process of 
countervalence would occur and, thereby, prevent any entrenched elite 
or stable coalition from dominating the policy process. Because the 
propensity for voluntarily contributing to collective action is 
unevenly distributed across interest categories of differing sizes 




























































































and large categories of interests would remain effectively latent —  
protected only by their episodic voting power or the benevolent 
intervention of elites on their behalf. Olson barely refers to the 
class bias intrinsic in such disparities, but Claus Offe and Helmut 
Wiesenthal have developed this theme much more coherently and 
extensively in a recent article (21 ).
But these critiques of the free associability-political democracy 
nexus are, in a sense, "pre-corporatist." Convinced pluralists nay 
recognize them as distortions or problems, but they treat them as 
"ameliorable" by legal reform or "avoidable" through political 
struggle. After all, underorganized latent interests do have access 
to alternative channels of expression, e.g., territorial and partisan 
representation or single issue movements. Other, "solidary" and 
"purposive", incentives can be used to recruit members and attract 
contributions (22). Individuals can still "vote with their feet" 
against unrepresentative leaders, and shift to alternative suppliers 
of desired goods and services ( 23). Competition between overlapping 
associations can serve as a functional substitute for internal 
oligarchy. Mobilization of latent groups by aspiring entrepreneurs or 
conspiring elites can serve as a check on dominant "power blocs."
NEO-CORPORATISM AND THE SCIENCE OF ORGANIZATION
Above we have noted with approval Tocqueville's argument that 






























































































keep pace with social transformation. And neo-corporatist 
arrangements do seem to have a significant and independent effect 
upon the properties of participating interest associations. Their 
densities of membership go up almost to the point of saturation; 
their organizational resources increase and become more equally- 
distributed across incorporated interests; their range of activities 
becomes more varied and authoritative; their scope of representation 
becornes more comprehensive. Since these arrangements have not been' 
imposed by an authoritarian regime and asymmetrically manipulated 
from above to favor some interests over others —  as was the case of 
intervar state corporatist experiences —  and have been freely 
chosen, voluntarily maintained and occasionally renounced by 
organized groups seeking access to public authority, they would seem 
to embody the sort of adjustment that Tocqueville advocated. 
Moreover, again in contrast to the interwar period, the emergence of 
such arrangements was neither envisaged as a replacenent for 
traditional liberal forms of territorial representation, nor have 
they proven incompatible with such hallmarks of democratic procedure 
as freedom of speech and press, respect for the constitution, 
electoral competition, public disclosure, etc. In factor, many of the 
countries scoring highest in various indicators of neo-corporatism: 
Sweden, Norway, Austria, the Netherlands, for example, have been in 
the vanguard of extending equal citizen rights into new domains and 
equalizing the benefits from public policies.
What Tocqueville could not antecipate and what his subsequent 




























































































permanent, specialized and professionalized intermediaries between 
citizen and state night transform "the art of association" into "a 
science of organization". Instead of merely re-presenting 
independently formed nember preferences, associations could become 
institutions for inculcating and managing member interests. Instead 
of remaining multiple "véhiculés for meaningful participation", they 
/right increasingly become monopolistic "providers of indispensible 
services". What is more, instead of providing "havens of protection" 
for privately enjoyed satisfactions, they can co/iie to constitute more 
and more "conduits of intervention" for publicly supplied 
coordinations (24). Tocqueville assumed that voluntary associations 
would provide lively, significant and alternative sources of 
individual identification and political experience —  a sort of 
"secondary citizenship" outside the official one —  and that their 
activities would lessen rather than increase the need for 
involuntary, authoritative coordination of individual behaviors 
within society. Neo-corporatism has the potentiality of altering the 
relationship of me/iibers to their associations and the role of the 
latter inside the official realm of authority. In other words, it 
might be undermining the "virtuous circle" between associability and 
democracy.
Of course, all forms of specialized and institutionalized 
interest polities violate at least two prevailing norms of democracy. 
As several analysts have pointed out ( 25 ), votes are counted —  
presumably equally if the elections are honestly conducted —  but 




























































































their functional importance or political clout. Moreover, in voting 
systems decisions are usually taken by compiling a supportive 
jiiajority —  hcwever qualified. In interest bargaining, decisions are 
usually taken by forging a consensual co;npromise to which all actors 
agree —  however reluctantly. The historical emergence of this mode 
of structuring politial exchanges can be interpreted as an effort by 
minorities who wished their interests weighed and who were aware that 
their compliance was necessary for collective choice to be effective 
to protect themselves against majorities who wished their votes 
counted and who were confident that they could overcome dissenters by 
force of nujubers. Interest politicians successfully pitted one 
procedural norm (fi'eedom of association) against another (freedom of 
electoral expression)—  and one decision rule (consensus) against 
another (majoritarianism).
All neo-corporatism has done is to take this differentiation within 
democratic polities much further. With its hierarchic coordination, 
state recognition, policy concertation and devolved authority, it has 
separated more effectively than before the interaction between 
interest associations and public authorities from the vagaries of 
electoral success and legislative choice. With its monopolistic 
representation, elimination of overlapping domains and quasi­
voluntary membership, it has restructured the conditions of 
competition among associations by raising the cost of exercising 
"voice" through alternative channels and foreclosing the possibility 
of resorting to "exit". Without easy access to other channels of 




























































































\or a reasonable chance to create rival ones, individual citizens in 
neo-corporatist systems may find themselves deprived of the resources 
necessary to hold "their" representatives accountable and to ensure 
that policies pursued will be responsive to "their" concerns.
Presumably, this places a much more substantial burden on the quality 
of the political process within neo-corporatist associations than was 
the case in more pluralist systems with their overlapping structures 
and ease of entry and exit. The question becomes whether competition 
and participation are likely to be greater within monopolistic, 
heteronomous organizations that within multiple, autonomous ones. 
There is every reason to expect the contrary since —  with compulsory 
membership, provision of indispensible services, public 
subsidization, devolved authority and/or mandatory licensing —  neo- 
corporatist leaders can be largely freed from the constraint of 
inducing members to contribute and, hence, from the need to conform 
closely to members' preferences in order to extract those 
contributions. Moreover, their symbiotic relation to state authority 
encourages, if not requires, them to adopt a longer-tern view based 
on technical calculation and expert opinion.This enhances the role of 
professional staff at the expense of voluntary labor and more 
"spontaneous" expressions of preference, Therefore, one can presume 
that, in the normal course of transacting interest business, leaders 
will tend to discourage member participation and to underplay the 
role of militant mobilization. Follcv/ers will learn that associations 
have less and less to offer in the way of affective interaction and 




























































































"secondary citizenship", they are likely to take elsewhere, to 
political parties, community action groups, single issue movements, 
if they do repress them altogether.
Which is not to say that neo-corporatist practices in 
representation and policy-making are intrinsically anti- or un­
democratic. It does suggest that, where they have emerged and become
"science of organization" has already changed its decision rules and 
procedural norms.
NEO-CORPORATIST PRACTICES AND THE CITIZENSHIP PRINCIPLE
In our effort to develop normative standards for evaluating its 
performance, we defined modem, representative democracy as a general 
principle in search of a certain qualitative relationship between 
rulers and ruled. Connecting the two are decision rules, procedural 
norms and political institutions which have varied considerably over 
time —  no matter how established and definitive they nay appear at a 
given moment. Except in instances of dramatic re-founding after the 
collapse of an authoritarian regime or in periods of deliberate 
reformi in the face of manifest crisis, these specific rules, 
procedures and institutions tend to change slcwly, often
imperceptibly and usually by consensus under the pressure of 
opportunistic situations, international diffusion, or evolutionary





























































































Neo-corporatism is a good example of such a transformation 
within deuocratic polities in which the "procedural minimum" has been 
respected, but substantial changes in such things as majority rule, 
parliamentary sovereignty, public deliberation, etc. have occurred. 
Perhaps precisely because these contemporary trends in the 
organizational structure of interests and in their relation to 
policy-making have not been backed by an explicit ideology —  again 
in contrast to interwar, state or authoritarian corporatism — ; and 
because they evolved in such a piecemeal, uneven and almost 
surreptitious manner within distinct policy arenas, they have largely 
escaped evaluative scrutiny. Only once they have accumulated over 
time, so-to-spe<ak, and are manifestly affecting a wide range of 
producer and consumer, as well as citizen, behaviors is the question 
of their compatibility with democracy likely to arise —  and to 
attract the attention of scholars as well as activists.
Our first and most diffuse evaluative standard is whether these 
arrangements violate the principle of citizenship. Do they diminish 
the extent to which individuals have equal opportunities to act as 
citizens and to be treated as equals by their fellow citizens? Do 
they reduce the extent to which citizens feel obligated to respect 
choices made by collective deliberation among equals (or their 
representatives)?
If one equates the opportunity to act as citizen only with voting and 
the obligation to conform only to laws which have been certified by a 




























































































the citizenship principle. It introduces elements of "weighted" 
calculation and consensual bargaining with privileged minorities 
which clearly violate the sacred norms of "one man, one vote" and 
"the most votes win". It generates binding commitnents which either 
are never subject to parliamentary approval or involve a mere 
officializing of package-deals hammered out elsewhere. However, if 
one broadens the notion of equal political opportunity and treatment 
to include intra-electoral periods and extra-electoral processes, 
then neo-corporatism can be interpreted as extending the citizenship 
principle.
Basically, what it does is to resolve "the paradox of liberal 
associability" i.e. the fact that where the freedom to associate is 
equally accorded but the capacity to exercise this freedom is 
unequally distributed, those that most need to act collectively in 
defense of their interests are the least likely to be able to do so. 
Small, compact and privileged groups who are already better able to 
advance their interests through existing economic and social 
exchanges than larger, more dispersed and equally endowed ones, will 
find it easier to recruit members and extract contributions for a 
further defense of their interests in the political realm —  if and 
when such a response is required. Hence cones the theire of the 
"institutionalization of bias" in pressure politics which has been 
decried by so many critics of pluralism ( 26). What neo-corporatism 
does is shift the basis of associability from a predominantly 
voluntaristic and individualistic calculus to one where contributions 




























































































(or more difficult to avoid), and mutual recognition and official
expense of competing fraguents or individual actors. In short, as 
"free-riding" and "free-booting" become increasingly difficult under 
such arrangements, virtually everyone can be made to contribute and 
conform to associative action. This can have the effect of evening 
out considerably the organizational capacity of competing groups, 
particularly capital and labor. In addition, most neo-corporatist 
f orums are based on highly formalized systems of parity in 
representation and, not infrequently, produce policies which make the 
participating "social partners" co-responsible for their 
implementation. Under such conditions, organized socio-economic 
interests may never be equally counted, but they are likely to be 
uore equally weighed that they would be if citizens invested 
voluntarily and individually their cwn disparate resources and 
personal intensities in the liberal "art of association".
The normative problem with applying this "science of 
organization" to interest internediation is that it may make more 
equal the capacities for exerting influence of incorporated 
collectivities, at the same time it purposively excludes others which 
may be affected by their deliberations. So far, neo-corporatism has 
privileged interests organized along functional lines of production 
within a capitalist econony —  classes, sectors and professions. Its 
relative success has depended on restricting the number and identity 
of participants and passing on the costs to those not directly 
represented in its deliberations : consumers, taxpayers, youths,




























































































feminists, irregular workers, foreigners, cultural minorities, 
nature-lovers, pedestrians, prohibitionists, etc. Granted that the 
mor'e comprehensive scope of the associations engaged in neo- 
corporatist bargaining may encourage then to take into account some 
of these "marginal" interests, for example, when a comprehensive 
trade union calculates the effect of its demands on its member 
interests as consumers or when a national business association agrees 
to moderate its position in deference to the need for environmental 
protection, (27), but this is a tenuous and contingent relationship - 
- hardly reliable enough in the long-run to lead to an effective 
equalization of influence for such categories of citizens. Existing 
corporatist associations which defer too much to such interests risk 
a paralysis of their cwn internal decision structures and/or a 
defection of their own core supporters.
One "democratic" answer would be to extend the process of 
corporatization to cover interests structured along distributional 
lines or causes generated by cultural and ideological diversity, but 
that hardly seems feasible. Establishing monopolistic, hierarchically 
coordinated and topically differentiated national associations for, 
say, consumers, taxpayers, youths, environmentalists and foreign 
residents would likely involve such extensive state intervention and 
subsidization that it would be difficult to avoid the appearance, not 
to mention the reality, of manipulation and cooptation from above. 
The officially recognized associations would be simply disavowed by 
their nominal members and lose all credibility for contracting in 




























































































very existence in ways that defy professionalized representation and 
bureaucratic encadreruent. To be organized corporatistically would 
destroy the very basis of their collective identity. Finally, even if 
the organizational problan could be solved, bringing such a quantity 
and variety of recognized interlocutors into the policy-jnaking 
process on a co-equal basis would destroy the properties of small 
group interaction, specialized competence, reciprocal trust and 
propensity for compromise which have contributed so much to the 
viability of existing neo-corporatist arrangements.
In summary, a pattern of more equalized and formally structured 
exchange aiiong associations has aierged in some democratic countries 
—  a sort of corporatism for the functionally privileged —  which 
could be defended as a direct extension of the citizenship principle 
outside the electoral-parliamentary arena in ways that go beyond the 
formalistic opportunities afforded by liberal associability. 
Moreover, its operation has undoubtedly had the indirect effect of 
promoting policies which have extended citizen rights to protection 
against unemployment, to more extensive welfare services and to 
representation within institutions previously governed by other 
authority principles, especially business firms and state agencies. 
Citizens of pluralistically structured policies have suffered
significantly greater inequalities in all these domains. Its 
unintended consequence, hcwever, has been to consolidate a disparity 
between these more equally competent and privileged class, sectoral 
and professional interests and less equally competent and organized 




























































































disadvantaged and the culturally underprivileged. Since there appear 
to be serious impediments to extending neo-corporatist practices to 
these latter interest domains and since at least sone of these appear 
to be of genuine concern to the citizenry of contemporary 
democracies, neo-corporatism is neither fully compatible with the 
citizenship principle nor are decisions nade under its auspices 
likely to go unchallenged by those who are expected to obey them. 
However, like so many of its forerunners in the history of danoc'ratic 
development, its norms and institutions nay long be tolerated as a 
second best compromise : "a better system than those that preceded it 
and those that have hitherto followed it" (28).
A SHIFT IN TOE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY ?
By now, it should be fairly evident what neo-corporatism can do to 
the quality of democracy —  at least from the evaluative perspective 
adopted in this essay. The loader will recall Figure I in which five 
qualities were generated from a matrix which distinguished 
dichotomously between two units of reference ( individual citizens or 
public authorities ) and two aspects of governance ( openness to inputs 
"of the people" ox- processing of outputs "for the people"), and which 
placed one feature of democratic performance at the center, 
presumably linking all the other virtues in a coherent whole.
Expressed in its graphic terms, neo-corporatist arrangements shift 




























































































and accessibility tcward a greater emphasis on accountability, and 
responsiveness. Individual citizens become less intensely and 
directly involved in political life; at the same time, organizations 
active in their interests become increasingly integral components of 
the policy process. The number and type of interlocutors with 
equivalent and effective access to authorities decrease considerably 
due to the recognition of monopolies, the creation of associational 
hierarchies and the formalization of functional systems of 
representation; at the sane time those that are able to obtain such 
privileged status acquire more resources and become more 
indispensible to the management of public affairs so that arbitrary 
(and often self-serving) actions by state officials become less 
likely. Subjects of collective choice which were highly politicized, 
i.e. subject to intense citizen concern, public debate, group 
mobilization and extensive pressure become less so; at the same time 
that institutions of administrative and market allocation which were 
previously defined as outside the realm of democratic polities become 
subject to greater scrutiny by political associations.
In the midst of this shift from participation/accessibility to 
accountability/responsiveness lies a phenomenon which modem 
democratic theory has been ill-prepared to analyze or even to 
recognize —  namely, the developaent of "private" or "class 
governance". Perhaps, one major reason for this steais from its 
historical roots in liberalism. Democratic theory was originally 
closely identified with the liberal struggle against the constraints 




























































































behavior of individuals : guild restrictions, state-chartered 
Monopolies, licensing provisions, etc. It continued to regard all 
associations which subsequently grew up under its tolerance and 
encouragement as purely voluntary and autonomous, an embodinent of 
that original resistance to regimentation and loss of individual 
freedom.
Neo-corporatism changes not merely the resources of associations 
and the nature of policy-making. It can also radically alter the 
relationship between interest groups and their members. Instead of 
merely aggregating independently formed preferences and articulating 
them before authorities,its associations acquire an enhanced capacity 
for defining the interests of mei.ibers and controling their behavior. 
In the pluralist idiom, information is the key resource involved in 
interest exchange; in the corporatist mode, it becomes compliance. 
Associations do not just inform policy-makers about the intensities 
of preference and likely reactions of their members, expecting 
officials to react accordingly; they also agree —  for a price —  to 
deliver member compliance to contracts negotiated with the approval 
of public authorities. All this presumes, of course, that it will be 
to the long-term benefit of noubers to be forced to cooperate 
irrespective of their individualistic, short-tern preferences. 
Occasionally and always reluctantly, neo-corporatist organizations 
may even have to wield directly the coercive powers necessary to keep 
dissident Members ( and even non-members where contracts are extended 
to cover a whole category) in line: fines, expulsions, refusal to 




























































































generated consensually from within or devolved legally upon it from 
without, the net result is the same. The society acquires a set of 
parallel institutions of saui-private or semi-public governance 
capable of coordinating the behavior of some large social aggregates 
—  classes, sectors, professions —  without directly burdening or 
involving state authorities. This may provide one element for 
explaining why the more neo-corporatist polities have proven 
demonstrably more "governable" in recent decades than pluralist ones 
at a similar level of capitalist developaent and organizational 
complexity ( 29).
This leaves us with competitiveness, the quality of democracy which 
putatively ties all the others together. What happens to it under the 
auspices of neo-corporatism? Obviously, some forms are elinunated 
altogether or reduced to insignificance. Groups with overlapping 
domains no longer compete for members or for access to public 
authorities on the same issues. Factions within associations are less 
likely to risk investing their resources in founding alternative 
organizations, if only because other public and private interlocutors 
will persist in recognizing only the officially monopolistic one. 
Under a general process of incorporation, highly specialized or very 
particularistic, "maverick groups" will find it increasingly prudent 
to merge with larger and more established units or to accept 
coordination from overarching "peak associations" if they do not wish 




























































































It is not cleat' whether the politics within neo-corporatist 
organizations is likely to become more competitive as that between 
than diminishes (30). Certainly, the rewards for winning office 
became more substantial with the increase in associational resources 
and seird-public functions, but that may only encourage entrenched 
oligarchies to defend their positions more assiduously and taupt 
state and party officials to intervene in order to ensure that 
interest interlocutors will continue to play the responsible and 
respectful role assigned to than. At the level of national peak 
associations, executive leaders become highly visible and influential 
figures who can count on help from "outsiders" provided they agree to 
stay within the rules of the corporatist game.
But this does not mean that competitiveness disappears 
altogether under such arranganents. Rather its effect tends to 
becoiie more implicit than explicit, more potential than observable. 
One must never forget that neo-corporatism is a chosen, not an 
imposed, strategy for the promotion and defense of interests, and 
that it is not the only mode of intermediation between citizens and 
authorities. Associations can withdraw from negotiations patterned 
this way —  and they can survive, even prosper, by engaging in 
classic pressure politics. Specific issues can be taken to other 
arenas —  and they can be articulated through single issue movements 
or spontaneous protest actions. Association members are also voting 
citizens —  and they can express their dissatisfaction by switching 
allegeance among existing parties or by supporting new ones. Parties 




























































































and their successors in government nay choose to dismantle or ignore 
those arrangements. Parliaments can assert their legal sovereignty —  
and they can refuse to ratify the social contracts which are put 
before than. Members can refuse to obey the directives of their 
associations —  and the sanctions available nay be sufficiently weak 
or difficult to wield that they can get away with such defections. 
The fact that such occurences have been relatively rare in neo- 
corporatist polities does not alter the latent role that 
competitiveness continues to play in setting boundaries upon such 
arrangeients. Participants in them are forced to antecipate that such 
reactions could occur and to adjust their bargaining behavior 
accordingly. They cannot act as if neo-corporatism were the only game 
in town. Observers, however, who predicted its imminent demise after 
each wildcat strike or electoral failure of Social Democracy have 
been generally disappointed. It even appears to be surviving under 
the conditions of increased national and international 
competitiveness induced by protracted recession and consequent 
failure to meet such performance goals as full employment and 
economic growth. Nevertheless, the politics of these countries has 
not settled into some "post-problematic" consensus. Controversial 
items still manage to get on their agendas for collective 
deliberation; citizens continue to be offered real choices; 
associational leaders know they must be accountable to member 





























































































Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that many of the polities where 
neo-corporatist practices have become most firmly entrenched have 
either inherited (e.g. Switzerland) or experimented with (e.g. 
Sweden, Norway, Dermiark, Austria, Western Germany) a wide range of 
institutional innovations which have extended the equal rights of 
individual citizens in their direct interaction with public officials 
and partisan representatives: referenda, proportional representation, 
ombudsiiian systems, subsidies for political parties and citizen 
groups, elections to works councils, public disclosure laws, 
decentralized administration, protection of personal data, profit 
sharing arrangements and so forth. One can argue that not all of 
these have had that much of an impact (and some have been very 
selectively implemented), but one can hardly fault these systems for 
not trying. It is at least plausible that discussion of than and 
their eventual presence in political life has effectively compensated 
for some of the more insidious and less positive effects that 
creeping neo-corporatism has had upon the other denocratic qualities 
of participation, accessibility and competitiveness.
Finally, one must acknowledge the almost complete absence of popular 
resistance to neo-corporatist trends in those countides. This is all 
the more remarkable since they have rarely been defended explicitly 
and globally. Ordinarily they have only been sanctioned pragmatically 
on a case-by-case basis. No one confesses to being a "Corporatist", 
or even to some euphemism thereof. There exists no explicit 




























































































deuocratic principles or procedures. And yet citizens have by-and- 
large accepted it upon reflection. They might recognize that its 
auergence has altered their rights and obligations and they might 
occasionally gruuible to survey researchers that "organized business", 
"ox'ganized labor" or "organized professions" seen to have too much 
influence, but few if any seaa to feel that they have lost more than 
they have gained by entrusting the managanent of their interest 
politics to such interuediaires. Ironically, it is in those countries 
whose interest associations have been least corporatized that one 
most often hears the epithet: "Corporatist" thrown at opponents,and 
that intellectuals denounce all signs of its prospective auergence as 
a threat to traditional freedouis and democratic institutions.
THE SPECTRE OF VICARIOUS DEMOCRACY?
So, does this mean that the more neo-corporatist polities are 
already headed toward sane new form of post-individualistic, 
vicarious deuocracy, with other advanced industrial/capitalist 
societies soon to follow? That the famous nyth of the rational, well- 
inf orned and active citizen has finally been put to rest and been 
replaced by the spectre of the reasonable, well-staffed and 
recognized association as the basic unit of democracy? That the 
notion of a civil society composed of natural groups voluntarily 
entering into exchanges in the pursuit of their own autonomously 
defined preferences and capable of reproducing itself without the 




























































































said-public society composed of ai'tif actual organizations 
coiapulsorily negotiating compromises in the pursuit of their members' 
imputed interests and capable of sustaining itself only by symbiotic 
interdependence with public authorities?
Let us leave aside the probability that neo-corporatism and 
vicarious democracy nay well be a solution to the problem of modern 
interest conflict confined to particular countries and national 
circumstances. Snail size, high international vulnerability, well- 
established state legitimacy, centralized administrative structures, 
cleat' preponderence of class cleavage over other bases of social and 
cultural conflict, ideological hegemony of social democratic over 
liberal bourgeois values are all factors which seem to have 
contributed to the emergence of such a pattern, although they nay not 
necessarily all be prerequisites for such an outcome in the future.
I suspect that the answer to the "paradox of corporatist 
associability" —  to its ambiguous impact on the practice of 
democracy —  eventually lies in the truth of what is one of the most 
central tenets of the theory of democracy, namely, that for a polity 
to be really responsive to the needs and concerns of its citizens, 
these individual citizens must participate actively and freely in the 
definition of those needs and the expression of those concerns. They 
must not only have the "enlightened understanding" of their interests 
which Robert Dahl so rightly stressed, but they must also have the 
resources and the desire to engage in the political struggle 




























































































either by those who govern or by seeking thaiiselves to govern. 
Specialized experts, organic intellectuals, designated spokespersons, 
professional intermediaries, benevolent rulers, etc. may, in some 
contexts and for some period of time, be better informed and more 
capable of interpreting the interests of social groups, but unless 
they are kept accountable by an active citizenxy, their theories and 
suppositions about what is good for their members, clients, 
followers, etc. are likely to prove erroneous in the long run. What 
is moro, the organizational and political "rents" which these 
intermediaries extract for the service they perform will
systematically distort the very content of demands made upon the 
polity.
The progressive assertion of interest politics, its conversion 
from an "art of association", into a "science of organization", nay 
have greatly changed the identity of relevant actors. It may have 
expanded the resources and extended the range of such intermediaries.
The emergence of a neo-corporatist mode may have increased the 
immediate govemability, improved the aggregate economic performance 
and equalized access to policy-making in advanced capitalist 
societies, but the "vicarious democracy" which has accompanied these 
transformations may not prove so satisfying and in the long run so 
governable. Rulers nay become more accountable under such k 
arrangements, but to the wrong collectivities —  not necessarily to 
the units with which persons voluntarily identify and from which they 
naturally derive a sense of shared existence, but to those which 





























































































formally organized, often at levels of aggregation far above that 
which would have been spontaneously forthcoming. Governments may also 
be more responsive, but to the wrong needs —  not necessarily to 
those which individuals would thauselves feel and become concerned 
about, but to those which professional intermediaries have defined 
and promoted as the "real" interests of their respective memberships 
or clienteles —  often while including substantial sidepaynents for 
thauselves and the organizations which they control.
Whatever impact the organization of interest politics has had 
upon political pe/'f on nance, whatever has been the relationship 
between neo-corporatism and governability, whatever both have done to 
gicwth, equality and democracy, it is difficult to imagine that these 
changes have completely voided the old liberal adage that "each 
individual person is the best judge of his or her cwn interests." 
Ultimately, if not immediately, the polity will be judged by its 
ability to satisfy these interests —  not just those which have been 
identified, given generic labels and packaged collectively by 
intei'mediaries and to which authorities have presumably been 
dutifully accountable and responsive. Moreover if, among these 
"really felt" interests of individual citizens, are distinctively 
political needs for active participation and close access to rulers, 
then one would have even juoi’e grounds for suspecting that the sort of 
"vicarious democracy" promoted by neo-corporatism will prove to be 
but a passing phase —  hopefully, an appropriate and proportionate 
(if temporary) adjustment in the "art of association" that 
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